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ABSTRACT 
 
Does Monitoring Decrease Work Effort?  
The Complementarity Between Agency  
and Crowding-Out Theories 
 
Agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should motivate the agent to 
raise his effort level whereas the “crowding-out” literature suggests that it may reduce the 
overall work effort. These two assertions are not necessarily contradictory provided that the 
nature of the employment relationship is taken into account (Frey, 1993). Based upon a real-
task laboratory experiment, our results show that principals are not trustful enough to refrain 
from monitoring the agents, and most of the agents react to the disciplining effect of 
monitoring. However we find also some evidence that intrinsic motivation is crowded out 
when monitoring is above a certain threshold. We identify that both interpersonal 
principal/agent links and concerns for the distribution of output payoff are important for the 
emergence of this crowding out effect.  
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1. Introduction 
Monitoring of performance is a costly activity.  Is it always an efficient one?  One might 
consider the absence of agent monitoring by a principal as a weakness that can be 
exploited by rational cheaters because of the disutility of effort.  However, little 
monitoring may also be considered an expression of trust that can be rewarded through 
effort.  As a consequence, additional monitoring of agent performance should diminish 
shirking (i.e., increase worker effort) in one case, whereas in the second case monitoring 
should diminish effort by focusing on the market exchange nature of the employment 
relationship and by reducing intrinsic motivation for effort.  These different rationales 
are grounded in two opposing theories.  On the one hand, based on self-interested 
behavior, agency theory assumes that tighter monitoring by the principal should 
motivate the agent to raise his effort level in order to reduce the risk of a penalty if 
caught shirking (Alchian and Demsetz, 1972; Calvo and Wellisz, 1978; Fama and 
Jensen, 1983; Laffont and Martimort, 2002; Prendergast, 1999).  On the other hand, the 
“crowding-out” theory1 suggests that tighter monitoring may reduce overall work effort 
because of the hidden cost of sanctions.  According to this theory, economic incentives 
such as monetary rewards or sanctions may undermine intrinsic motivation if they are 
considered as being controlling, thus reducing either the agents’ self-esteem or self-
                                                 
1 The crowding-out theory has been mostly developed by social psychologists in connection with the so-
called cognitive evaluation theory (Deci, 1971, 1975; Deci, Koestner and Ryan, 1999). These analyses 
have notably emphasized the hidden cost of rewards (Lepper and Greene, 1978). The existence of a 
crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation is, however contested (Prendergast, 1999) or neglected by 
most economists. Exceptions are  Titmuss, 1970 (who argued that paying for blood donation would 
destroy the willingness to donate) and more recently, Bohnet, Frey and Huck, 2000; Drago, 1989; Frey, 
1997; Frey and Oberholzer-Gee, 1997; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Kreps, 1997, Benabou and Tirole, 
2002. In particular, Kreps states that if employees develop intrinsic motivation in reaction to fuzzy 
extrinsic incentives, the introduction of explicit incentives may diminish intrinsic motivation for work. 
Benabou and Tirole try to reconcile psychology and economic approaches showing that rewards may be 
strong, weak or negative reinforcers depending on the ability of the agent, the attraction and its discussion 
of the task, the asymmetry of information regarding the agent’s talent and the nature of the task. 
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determination.2 Monitoring is thus considered as signal for lack or breach of trust.  This 
interpretation is also consistent with the social exchange theory (Blau, 1964; Hollander, 
1990; Homans, 1961). 
In this paper, we test experimentally these two opposing assertions considering that they 
are not necessarily contradictory provided that the nature of the principal-agent 
relationship is taken into account.  Frey, 1993 distinguishes the disciplining effect and 
the crowding-out effect of monitoring and hypothesizes that the disciplining effect will 
likely dominate in abstract relationships, while the crowding-out effect is likely to 
dominate in interpersonal relationships.  In the latter case, more monitoring may be 
interpreted by the agent as a sign of distrust that will crowd-out intrinsic motivation and 
lead to lower effort.  In contrast, in an abstract relationship, no such psychological effect 
should arise because there are no personal trust or benevolence relationships between 
the principal and the agent.  The aim of our study is thus to use a controlled real-task 
laboratory experiment to analyze the influence of the nature of the employment 
relationship on the relative importance of disciplining effect and the crowding-out effect 
of monitoring on the agents’ work effort. 
Psychologists have provided compelling experimental evidence for the existence of a 
crowding-out of intrinsic motivation by rewards (see the meta-analysis by Deci, et al., 
1999, and its critics by Eisenberger, Pierce and Cameron, 1999).  Experimental 
economists have also recently collected evidence on this effect (Fehr and Gächter, 2002; 
Frey and Jegen, 2000; Gneezy and Rustichini, 2000; Gächter and Falk, 2002).3 
                                                 
2 Corroborating this analysis, Bewley, 1999 shows, from interviews with managers and labor leaders, that 
the risk for managers of using threats is a loss of worker initiative. 
3 Gneezy and Rustichini (2000) show that the subjects working for free reached the same level of 
performance that the subjects who received a high pay and a much higher outcome than those who were 
paid a small amount of money. Fehr and Gächter (2002) and Gächter and Falk (2002)  provide 
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However, evidence of a crowding-out effect of the probability of monitoring instead of 
certain rewards on performance remains scarce and the lack of naturally-occurring data 
usually leads to indirect tests of competing hypotheses.  Some supporting evidence for 
the crowding out hypothesis is found in a survey of managers, where Barkema, 1995, 
and Frey, 1993 document a negative effect of monitoring on hours worked when the 
principal is a CEO but a positive effect when the manager is supervised impersonally by 
a parent company.  Nevertheless, the data is not conclusive given the measurements 
used and the difficulty in controlling for confounding factors.4  An experimental 
procedure can help mitigate such concerns by collecting controlled data on both 
monitoring and performance.   
Other evidence is found in more controlled settings.  A field experiment on call centers 
confirms the rational cheater hypothesis but shows that employees do not respond to the 
exogenous manipulation of monitoring rates when they think the employer is being fair 
(Nagin, Rebitzer, Sanders and Taylor, 2002).  In a laboratory experiment, Schulze and 
Frank, 2003 show that monitoring reduces corruption through deterrence but it also 
destroys the intrinsic motivation for honesty.  With ultimatum games, Guerra, 2002 
observes that by reducing trust opportunities, monitoring has a negative impact on the 
behavior of honest individuals.  Indirect evidence is also provided by Fehr and Schmidt, 
2000, who show that effort is lower when principals condition a fine on the deviation 
from the desired effort level.  Finally, Fehr and List, 2002 observe both hidden costs of 
sanctions (the use of an explicit threat to sanction shirking backfires by inducing less 
                                                                                                                                               
experimental evidence that incentive contracts are less efficient than contracts without any incentives 
because of the crowding-out effect; nevertheless principals prefer using the incentive contracts because 
they can reach a higher share of the surplus. 
4 Managers’ effort is measured by the number of hours worked and the intensity of monitoring by the 
regularity, the specificity and the formality of the evaluation procedure. However, there is no direct 
connection between the content of the evaluation procedure and the level of work effort supplied. 
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trustworthy behavior) and hidden rewards (refraining from using an available threat is 
considered a trusting act reciprocated by a trustworthy choice of effort).  
Our approach contributes to the existing literature on discipline vs. crowding-out effect 
of monitoring in three ways: it uses a real task experiment; it analyzes whether these 
effects depend on the nature of the employment relationship; it studies whether they 
differ according to the sharing rules of the output between the principal and the agent 
(i.e., the payoff rules).  The principal determines her intensity of monitoring by 
choosing among audit or monitoring probabilities ranging from no monitoring (0%) to 
certain monitoring (100%).  This intervention may be considered as controlling and not 
informative.  Informed of this probability, the agent has to perform a costly real task.  
Choosing a value of effort from a table of hypothetical effort cost choices, as in some of 
the existing research, may involve intrinsic motivation like reciprocity.  However, we 
prefer a real effort experiment because it also involves intrinsic motivation for the task 
itself and is more parallel to a real work setting.  Thus, our paper also contributes to the 
experimental literature analyzing effort in a real work setting (Falk and Ichino, 2003; 
Dickinson, 1999; Sillamaa, 1999; van Dijk, Sonnemans and van Winden, 2001; Gneezy, 
Niederle and Rustichini, 2003; Montmarquette, Rulliere, Villeval and Zeiliger, 2005).  
To measure the influence of the nature of the employment relationship, the experiment 
was conducted in two environments.  An “abstract employment relationship” is proxied 
by using a stranger matching protocol so that no principal engages in a repeated 
interaction with the same employee.  Our proxy for an “interpersonal relationship” is a 
partner matching protocol in which decision-making is no longer anonymous.  In 
addition, under the partner matching that we utilize, the subjects of the same 
principal/agent pair are given time to introduce themselves to each other before 
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engaging in the experimental decision-making.  Because the members of the pair know 
that they will be able to comment on their respective decision at the end of the session, 
the absence of anonymity introduces an informal control which, according to the 
crowding-out theory, should both reduce the intensity of monitoring and increase its 
crowding-out effect.  
To identify the influence of distributional concerns, we compare two treatments.  In one 
treatment, the principal’s payoff increases in the agent’s effort (the Variable treatment) 
whereas in the other one, the principal’s payoff is not directly affected by agent effort 
(the Fixed treatment).  Fehr and Rockenbach, 2003 hypothesize that the negative 
motivational effects of sanctions on altruistic cooperation appear if associated with 
greedy or selfish intentions.  This suggests that in the Fixed treatment monitoring 
should not be interpreted as motivated by greediness or selfishness but by the 
willingness to enforce the respect of a non-shirking norm; one should then only observe 
the disciplining effect of monitoring.  Thus, we have a 2x2 experimental design 
(abstract/interpersonal and Fixed/Variable). 
Our results indicate that the disciplining effect of monitoring dominates in abstract 
relationships as expected but is also present in interpersonal relationships.  Whatever the 
nature of the relationship, principals are not trustful enough to refrain from monitoring 
and most agents react to the disciplining effect of monitoring by increasing effort.  
However, we also observe some evidence of a crowding-effect of intrinsic motivation 
when some specific conditions are met.  An indication of the existence of intrinsic 
motivation lies in the fact that a significant proportion of the agents perform at the 
desired output level when their principal shows no willingness to monitor.  Monitoring 
may undermine intrinsic motivation when the monitoring intensity exceeds its 
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equilibrium level, when the employment relationship is based on interpersonal links and 
when distributional concerns are at work. 
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows.  Section 2 presents the structure and 
the different treatments of the monitoring game, and its theoretical predictions.  Section 
3 introduces the experimental design.  Section 4 presents the statistical analysis and its 
results. The final section discusses and concludes. 
2. The monitoring game 
The game involves two players, a principal and one agent, { },i P A∈ .  An output , y, 
is produced by the agent.  This output depends on the agent’s effort and on the difficulty 
of his task.  From this basic structure, we examine two treatments which differ in the 
effect of this output on the payoffs of the principal.  In the Variable Treatment, 
additional effort by the agent directly increases the payoff of the principal.  
Alternatively, in the Fixed Treatment, the agent’s effort does not directly affect the 
principal’s payoff.  After a description of these Treatments, theoretical predictions will 
be drawn.  
2.1.Two Treatments 
Consider first the Variable Treatment.  In Stage one, the principal offers the contract 
( )ˆ, , , , ,W w w y y m  to the agent, consisting of three wage levels, W, w and w , 
corresponding to various levels of outputs, a desired level of output yˆ , a minimum 
output requirement y , and a probability of audit m (i.e., the monitoring intensity). 
Payment to the agent is 100W =  if his output is not audited or if it meets the desired 
level of output ˆ 75y =  in the event of an audit.  If audited and output is between the 
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minimum, 40y = , and the desired level (i.e., ˆiy y y≤ < ) then w=60 is paid.  Finally, if 
the output is below the minimum requirement iy y< , then the agent receives the 
minimum wage 20w = .  The monitoring intensity, ( ).0,.1,...,1m∈ , represents the 
probability that the agent’s output will be audited, and it is the only decision variable for 
the principal.  Monitoring is costly for the principal beyond some minimum level, 
0.2m = .  The intuition is that below a certain level, monitoring is not costly because 
simple observation may be sometimes sufficient to detect shirking.  If shirking at some 
level has been verified, the principal punishes him by paying a lower wage, w or w .  
The differences between W  and w  and between W  and w  can be considered as fines, 
and the size of the fine depends on the extent of shirking. 
The principal chooses her intensity of monitoring according to its cost, given by the 
following convex cost function: 
  ( ) ( )
21.5m m
c m
b
−=         (1) 
with .2m = , the threshold for a free monitoring and .02b = . 
After rounding numbers up, monitoring costs are displayed in Table 1. 
 
Table 1. Monitoring costs by intensity of monitoring 
 
m  .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 
( )c m  0 0 3 8 15 24 36 50 66 84 
 
The (expected) payoff function of the principal in the Variable Treatment is given by: 
 
(2) 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
ˆ
ˆ
i i
PV i i
i i
vy W c m if y y
vy W m W w c m if y y y
vy W m W w c m if y y
π
 − − ≥= − + − − ≤ < − + − − <
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with 2.5v =  (each unit of output of the agent increases the principal’s payoff by 2.5). 
In Stage two, once the principal chooses a contract ( )ˆ, , , , ,W w w y y m , the agent is then 
informed of this contract and cannot reject it.5  Knowing his payoff function, the payoff 
function of the principal, and the monitoring probability, the agent has to decide on his 
level of effort needed to produce the output ( )0,1,...,100iy ∈ . 
The agent has to perform a real task, inspired from Montmarquette, et al., 2005 and 
described in detail below.  This task consists of progressing along a curve and output is 
measured by the height reached on this curve.  Progression on the curve is made by 
means of regular-steps that are free and by means of rapid-steps that are costly.  
Performing a higher output usually entails a marginally increasing monetary cost that is 
linked to speed of progression chosen by the agent: 
 ( ) ( )i r rc y f sα=  (3) 
where s  is the number of rapid-steps and α  the cost of these steps, and the subscript r 
indicates the rank of these costly steps.  ( )0 0c =  and ( ) 0c y = , that is, the minimum 
required output can always be performed without any monetary cost.  In the experiment, 
the convexity of costs is given as follows: 
Table 2. Costs of the rapid steps 
 
Rank of the rapid-steps 1 to 10 11 to 20 21 and more 
Cost of each rapid-step .4 .6 1.0 
  
                                                 
5 There is no stage in the game where the agent accepts or rejects the contracts. The experiment is setup 
so that the participation and incentive compatible constraints are always met from the beginning. A 
subject who would like to express negative reciprocity must do it through his effort decision. 
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Ten different curves are used in the experiment and they are designed such that, on 
average, it costs 20 points to perform yˆ  (this information is common knowledge).  The 
minimum cost is 0 and the maximum cost is 70 depending on the difficulty of the 
curves.  ( )*W c y≥  ensures that the participation constraint holds.  
The agent’s (expected) payoff function is given by: 
( )
( ) ( )
( ) ( )
ˆ
ˆ
i i
i i i
i i
W c y if y y
W c y m W w if y y y
W c y m W w if y y
π
 − ≥= − − − ≤ ≤ − − − <
                      (4) 
Once the agent has performed the task, in Stage three, the monitoring probability is 
applied, the audit occurs or not depending on the draw, and payoffs are displayed.   
Consider now the Fixed Treatment.  The principal also offers the contract 
( )ˆ, , , , ,W w w y y m  to the agent with the same wage values and corresponding output 
thresholds, the same monitoring cost function than in the Variable Treatment.  But in 
contrast, the principal’s payoff consists of a flat fee and no longer increases in the 
agent’s output.  The principal’s (expected) payoff function in the Fixed Treatment is 
now given by: 
 
                                (5) 
 
where 180f =  is the flat fee given to the principal.  The agent has the same payoff and 
cost functions as in the Variable treatment. 
( )
( )
( ) ( )
ˆ
ˆ( )
i
PF i
i
f W c m if y y
f W m W w c m if y y y
f W m W w c m if y y
π
 − − ≥= − + − − ≤ < − + − − <
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2.2.Theoretical Predictions 
Consider first the Variable Treatment and the behavior of the agent.  A risk-neutral and 
selfish agent performs at the desired output level yˆ  if his certain payoff of no shirking 
is equal or higher than the expected benefit of producing an output below the desired 
level yˆ  and below the minimum required output y .  Considering that wages are flat 
fees (either equal to W , w  or w ), the agent should not choose any other output than y  
or 0, once he has decided to shirk.  So, we have two no-shirking conditions depending 
on the reference level of output, yˆ  or y : 
No-shirking condition 1: 
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 1i i i i i iy y W c y E y y m w c y m W c yπ π≥ = − ≥ < = − + − −                   (6) 
No-shirking condition 2:  
( ) ( ) [ ] ( ) ( )ˆ ˆ ˆ( ) ( ) 1i i i i i iy y W c y E y y y m w c y m W c yπ π≥ = − ≥ ≤ < = − + − −             (7) 
Since ( ) ( )0 0c y c= = , the binding constraint (7) for reaching yˆ  simplifies as: 
                                              ( ) ( )ˆc y m W w≤ −                                                          (8) 
That is, the marginal cost of yˆ  must be less than or equal to its marginal benefit.  
In addition, a rational and selfish agent should never perform more than yˆ  with costly 
steps since performing more than yˆ  yields no additional earnings to the agent.  The best 
reply output choices *iy  for a selfish agent to each monitoring intensity depends on the 
comparison between expected marginal cost and expected marginal benefit of choosing 
yˆ  vs. y .  With our parameterization and an average cost of 20 necessary to reach the 
desired output level, the best reply effort changes at .5m = .  Below this level, the 
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marginal cost of yˆ  exceeds its marginal benefit so that the agent should choose zero 
effort in response to the absence of monitoring and y  for any positive value of m.  The 
optimal output of a rational and selfish agent in the Variable Treatment is thus: 
                                                 
0 0
* .5
ˆ .5
iV
if m
y y if m
y if m
 == < ≥
                                                 (9) 
An incentive compatible contract leads to * ˆiVy y=  for any monitoring probability at 
least equal to .5. 
Consider now the decision of a profit-maximizing principal.  The principal chooses the 
monitoring intensity that maximizes her expected payoff considering the rational choice 
of the agent.  This maximization can be written as: 
         ( ) ( )[ ]( ) 1 ( )
V
PV V i V V i Vm
Max E m vy c m w m vy c m Wπ = − − + − − −  % % %        (10) 
iy%  is the expected output from agent i and w%  is the expected wage depending on the 
verified level of output.  With probability Vm , output is audited and W, w  or w  is paid 
to an agent caught shirking.  With probability ( )1 Vm− , output is not verified and W is 
paid.  The monitoring cost appears in both terms: the principal has to pay this cost 
whether shirking is detected or not. 
In equilibrium, mV should be chosen such that the marginal cost of monitoring equals 
the expected marginal return of monitoring in terms of penalty (i.e., extra profit) for the 
principal if shirking is caught and in terms of additional output (increased monitoring 
may stimulate effort).  Since both the choice of output and the monitoring intensity are 
discrete choices, we can only consider the numerical solution of the game.  With our 
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parameterization, the principal reaches her maximum expected payoff when choosing 
.5Vm = .  Thus, in equilibrium, one obtains: 
*
*
.5
ˆ 75
100 20 80
187 15 100 72
V
iV
iV
PV
m
y y
π
π
=
= =
= − =
= − − =
 
Consider now the theoretical predictions for the Fixed Treatment.  Regarding the 
agent’s decision, the same no-shirking conditions applies than in the other treatment:  
( ) ( )ˆc y m W w≤ − .  Optimal output is thus: 
        
0 0
* .5
ˆ .5
iF
if m
y y if m
y if m
 == < ≥
                                                    (11) 
The principal chooses the monitoring intensity that maximizes her expected payoff 
considering the rational choice of the agent.  This maximization can be written as: 
     ( ) ( )[ ]( ) 1 ( )
F
PF F F F Fm
Max E m f c m w m f c m Wπ = − − + − − −  %          (12) 
with w%  the expected wage depending on the verified level of output.   
With our parameterization, the principal reaches her maximum expected payoff when 
choosing .3Fm = .  Thus, in equilibrium, one obtains: 
*
*
40
.3
(0.3)*60 (0.7)*100 88
(0.3)*(180 3 60) (0.7)*(180 3 100) 89
iF
F
iF
PF
y y
m
E
E
π
π
= =
=
= + =
= − − + − − =
 
A selfish principal chooses a low probability of monitoring (.3).  This contract is not 
efficient in the sense that the agent performs less than yi=75 in equilibrium.  The agent 
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should stop his effort as soon as he reaches y , which he can always reach without 
bearing any monetary cost.  Compared to the Variable Treatment, we should thus 
observe in the experiment a lower monitoring intensity and a lower output.  
However, the above predictions to not consider any behavioral motivations, which may 
change these predictions for both treatments.  A trustful principal could choose 0Vm = .  
A principal that does not use a costless opportunity to monitor signals her trust to the 
agent and the agent might be willing to reciprocate by increasing his effort.  A principal 
who chooses a higher level of monitoring than .4 pushes the agent to perform the output 
of 75; in the fixed treatment, this can be understood as the principal’s willingness to 
enforce a non-shirking moral norm since it reduces her own expected payoff and is not 
rational from a strictly monetary point of view.  An intrinsically motivated agent could 
perform at the desired output level even though he knows that the probability of being 
caught shirking is low or even absent either because he is motivated by the task or 
because he is willing to reciprocate the principal’s for her trust toward the agent.  If the 
agent performs an output higher than 40 with a monitoring probability lower than .5, it 
may also indicate intrinsic motivation.  Additionally, one can assume that these 
behavioral considerations are likely to be sensitive to the nature of the employment 
relationship and the payoff rules for the principal and the agent. 
3. Experimental Design 
We first focus on the originality of the experiment, regarding the design of the task to be 
performed by the agent and the design of the employment relationship.  Then, the 
experimental procedures will be detailed. 
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3.1. Design of the task 
The task of the principal-subjects is designed in a traditional way that allows to control 
for the amount of resources devoted to tracking the effort of agents.  The principal’s 
decision consists of choosing the monitoring intensity by means of a scrollbar on the 
computer screen.  The choice of monitoring intensity is represented as a probability of 
audit choice on the agent’s performance by the computer program, including all deciles 
between 0 (no monitoring) and 1 (certain monitoring).  The choice of probability 0 can 
be interpreted as a signal of trust to the agent since, below probability .3, monitoring is 
free of costs for the principal. 
The design of the agent’s task is more original due to the real task requested from the 
subjects.  Compared to the choice of effort values in tables, a real task experiment is 
closer to a real work setting and is more likely to involve intrinsic motivation for the 
task itself.  Our experiment uses about the same design of the task as the one described 
in Montmarquette, et al., 2005, but in an individual work environment.  The task 
consists of the search of the highest value of a multiple-peaked function in a two-
dimension space defined vertically by height (H) and horizontally by distance (D) from 
the origin, with [ ]0,100H ∈  and [ ]0,300D∈ , with ( )MaxH f D= .  The curve 
corresponding to this function is increasing, with a maximum of three peaks.  When the 
period starts, the box in which the curve will appear is fully black.  During a one minute 
period, the agent-subject uncovers progressively the curve on his computer screen 
starting at the origin, by clicking a button.  The subject moves by discrete steps on the 
horizontal axis that make him go upwards.  The curve and its surface become visible as 
the subject progresses.  The output achieved by the subject in a period is given by the 
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height reached on the curve, which depends notably on the number of moves.  The 
subject can stop his progression whenever he wants by stopping clicking.  
While performance is measured by the height parameter between 0 and 100, the cost of 
effort is captured through a monetary cost parameter.  Cost is represented through the 
choice of the speed of progression.  Parameters are chosen so that it is impossible to 
reach the required height during the one-minute period allowed by using the regular 
speed only.  Two buttons are available: regular (“1-steps”) or fast (“2-steps”), the 
second option enabling a twice as rapid move as the first option.  The subject can switch 
speeds whenever he wants and without any restriction in frequency.  The regular speed  
is costless, whereas each 2-step is costly as indicated in Table 2: each of the first 10 2-
steps costs .4 point; each of the 10 further 2-steps costs .6 and each further 2-step costs 
1 point.  On average, reaching the height 75 costs 20 points and this is common 
knowledge.  
  
 
Figure 1. An example of the task to be performed 
Each new period is associated with a new randomly chosen curve.6  As soon as a new 
period starts, the subject’s computer screen indicates currently the time left, the 
                                                 
6 The set of curves used in this experiment can be found at the following address: 
http://platypus.gate.cnrs.fr/groupware/g_gate/Courbes-MCV-DI.doc. 
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cumulated cost of 2-steps, and the height reached (see Fig.1).  These curves represent 
various degrees of difficulty depending on both the horizontal distances between the 75-
height and the origin  and between the maximum height and the 75-height.  An index of 
difficulty is calculated as ( )( )75 100 7510 D D D+ − , with 75D  the abscissa at the origin of 
the 75-height and 100D  the abscissa of the maximum height. 
The cognitive dimension of this task relates to the uncertainty about the shape of the 
curve, to time pressure and to the subject’s decision to use the fast speed.  For example, 
without any ex ante information about the shape of the curve, if a subject has already 
used many rapid moves to hasten progression and the curve remains flat, paying each 
additional costly step requires a continuous trade-off between its marginal cost and its 
expected marginal revenue.  At every point on the curve, the subject can never infer 
from the already uncovered part of the curve the slope of this curve at the next points.  
As a consequence, the task has a cognitive component since the subject cannot discover 
one single algorithm and he must make a continuous trade-off between his speed and 
the time left.  This is an important difference with other real effort experiments, notably 
van Dijk et al. (2001).  In addition, the design of this task leaves no room for a fear of 
dismissal, the search for co-workers’ esteem, or the disapproval of pairs who can be 
considered in natural settings as fuzzy motivators misattributed to intrinsic motivation 
(Kreps, 1997).  
3.2. Design of the employment relationship 
Frey, 1993 states that the disciplining effect of monitoring should be associated with an 
abstract employment relationship whereas its crowding-out effect would be associated 
with an inter-personal relationship.  In order to assess both effects, we utilize two 
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distinct experimental protocols to proxy abstract versus interpersonal relationships 
between principal and agent.  To identify the behavioral effect of these procedures, all 
the subjects were submitted to both protocols.  Specifically, a stranger matching 
protocol is used to proxy an abstract employment relationship with no repeated 
interactions.  With this protocol, principals and agents are randomly re-matched after 
each period and this is common knowledge.   
To proxy an interpersonal relationship, we allow for social exchange and social 
approval by using a partner matching protocol and by lifting anonymity of the subjects 
interacting in the same pair.  Specifically, a principal-agent pair is randomly matched 
and remains paired for ten periods, and subjects are made aware of this.  In addition, the 
subjects of each matching pair are introduced to each other.  The two members of each 
pair are seated face-to-face and they are given five minutes to talk together for 
introducing themselves to each other.  The subjects are aware that they are not allowed 
to comment on the experiment and on their past or their future decisions and they are 
not allowed to pass any side-payment agreement or to threat their partner.  This is 
controlled by the circulation of the experimentalists in the lab who could have kept the 
subjects to the rules if it had been needed.  To facilitate this introduction process and to 
focus the discussions on personal issues, we distributed a questionnaire sheet to each 
pair of subjects.7  This sheet of paper consisted of two parts, one about each member of 
the pair.  Each principal was requested to ask the questions to her agent and to write his 
answer, and vice-versa for the agent.  This moment was quite popular in all the sessions 
and it created a very animated and courteous atmosphere.  At the end of this 
introduction process, the members of a pair remain seated side by side but no longer 
                                                 
7 This questionnaire included questions about their given name, their number of siblings, their favorite 
music group, their hobby and the location of their past summer vacations. 
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face-to-face and they are not allowed to communicate any more.  This proximity is, 
however, such that each subject can anticipate that at the end of the session the members 
of the pair will be able to discuss and comment on their respective decisions.  
The aim of this design with repeated interactions that lifts anonymity is to emphasize 
the importance of social exchange and social approval considering that it constitutes a 
key aspect of interpersonal relationships (Blau, 1964).  This design has no implications 
on the theoretical predictions of the game with selfish preferences of the subjects.  It 
may have behavioral consequences by narrowing the social distance and by favoring 
empathy between the principal and the agent.  Research in online communication has 
also shown that, when comparing forms of communication like text-chat, text-to-speech 
and voice in social dilemma games, voice results in the highest level of cooperation 
(Jensen, Farnham, Drucker and Kollock, 2000).  The impact of  personal identification 
in experiments has been documented by various studies (see Kachelmeyer and Shebata, 
1997 for public goods games, Sally, 1995 for social dilemmas, and Falk et al, 1999 for 
the gift-exchange game).  
3.3 Experimental procedures 
Ten 20-period sessions of this experiment were realized in the experimental laboratory 
of GATE (Groupe d’Analyse et de Théorie Economique), Lyon, France.  Five sessions 
implemented the Variable Treatment and five other sessions the Fixed Treatment.  In 
total, we obtained 920 observations with the Variable Treatment and 900 with the Fixed 
Treatment.  In each slot of sessions, three out of five sessions implemented first the 
stranger matching protocol and then the partner protocol, the two other sessions 
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implemented the reverse order.8  This gives a total of 910 observations in each 
environment.  182 student-subjects were drawn from the undergraduate classes of the 
Chemicals and Textile School, the School of Management, the Central School of 
Engineers and a minority of students came from the department of economics.  No 
subject participated in more than one session.  
On average, a session lasted 75 minutes including initial instructions, practice periods 
and payment.  The experiment was computerized using the REGATE program (Zeiliger, 
2000).  Transactions were conducted in Experimental Currency Units, with the ECU-
Euro conversion rate set at ECU 150 = € 1.  The final payoff was given by the sum of 
the earnings in each period.  In addition, a show-up fee consisted of two elements.  First, 
at the beginning of the session and before the presentation of the instructions, each 
subject had to choose between two options consisting of either participating in a lottery 
with an expected payoff of € 2.5 or taking a certain gain of € 2, at the end of the session.  
This gives an (imperfect) indication about the subjects’ risk aversion that can be 
controlled for in the regressions to explain individual behavior.  Second, at the 
beginning of the game, each subject received an initial endowment of 150 ECUS to deal 
with the possibility of a loss in the first period.  On average, each subject earned € 13.42  
(S.D.=2.65).9  Subjects were immediately paid in cash in a separate room. 
Participants were randomly assigned to a specific computer terminal, depending on the 
computer name drawn randomly from an envelope upon entering the room.  Written 
                                                 
8 8 sessions were initially realized in which the order of the curves was the same in both parts of the 
experiment. 2 additional control sessions (one for each treatment) were conducted in which the order of 
the curves was changed in the second part of a session to control for a possible memory effect. A mean 
test shows that the average effort is not significantly different according to the order of the curves in the 
second part at the 5% level. 
9 With an average of € 13.35 for the principal-subjects (S.D.=2.87) and € 13.48 for the agent-subjects 
(S.D.=2.42) 
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instructions were distributed to participants and read aloud by the experimenter (see 
Appendix).  All participants were thus completely informed about the rules and 
parameters of the game. Instructions were phrased in neutral terms.10  Questions were 
answered privately by the experimenter.  Two practice periods were run11 and a 
questionnaire was passed to check the understanding of the instructions by the subjects 
before the first part of the experiment began.  Each subject was then randomly assigned 
by the computer the role of either principal (“X subject”) or agent (“Y subject”).  Each 
participant kept the same role throughout the session.  At the end of the first part, the 
game stopped and further instructions for the second part were distributed, without any 
questions allowed. 
At the beginning of each period, the X-subject chooses 
[0.0,0.1,0.2,0.3,0.4,0.5,0.6,0.7,0.8,0.9,1.0]m∈ .  The Y-subject was informed of this 
probability and had then to perform his task, deciding on his cost of effort.  At the end 
of the one-minute period of time, his output is checked according to the probability 
level chosen by the principal.  Then payoffs are displayed and a new period starts 
automatically.  At the end of each period, both the principal and the agent receive 
feedback on the output realized, whether audit occurred, and their actual payoffs. 
4. Experimental results 
We consider first the summary statistics before analyzing the principal and agent 
behaviors by means of a panel data analysis. 
 
                                                 
10 We spoke about a curve, an outcome, a check, a payoff, and we avoided loaded terms such as effort, 
monitoring and wage. 
11 Each subject had to practice the task to be performed by the sole agents afterwards because at this stage 
the subjects are not aware yet of the role they will be assigned and because it makes the principal aware 
of the possible difficulty of the task. 
 20
 
4.1. Summary statistics  
The data collected by means of this real-task experiment help in testing three main 
predictions of the model and its behavioral extensions.  The first two predictions relate 
to the principals’ decisions and the third one to the agents’ activity. 
First, under the assumption of selfishness, the monitoring probability is expected to be 
greater than .3 on average and should not be affected by the nature of the employment 
relationship.  In contrast, if the principal anticipates an agent’s intrinsic motivation in 
the experiment, then this should lead her to lower her monitoring intensity or even to 
give up monitoring, at least in the interpersonal employment relationship. 
We observe that the average monitoring probability is .369 in the abstract employment 
relationship and .361 in the interpersonal employment relationship.  The difference is 
not significant according to a Wilcoxon signed-rank test (z = .357).12  There is no 
monitoring in only 3.51% of the observations in the interpersonal relationship and 
2.31% in the abstract employment relationship; the difference is not significant 
(Wilcoxon test, z =  -1.436).  This suggests that the principals do not fully trust their 
agents even though they are engaged in an interpersonal relationship.  Intrinsic 
motivation, if it exists, is not thought to be sufficient to motivate the agent to perform 
the requested output level. 
Second, under the assumption of selfishness, the monitoring intensity should be higher 
in the Variable Treatment than in the Fixed Treatment.  If the monitoring intensity in the 
Fixed Treatment is equal or higher than in the Variable one, it is consistent with a 
willingness to enforce a moral norm. 
                                                 
12 In all the Wilcoxon tests which results are reported in this section, we consider 10 independent 
observations consisting of each of the 10 sessions. One session cannot give more than one independent 
observation because of the reshuffling of the pairs of subjects at each repetition of the game in 10 periods 
out of 20 when the stranger matching protocol is in use. 
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The observed average monitoring probability is .386 in the Variable Treatment and .344 
in the Fixed Treatment.  The monitoring probability is slightly lower than the 
equilibrium value in the Variable Treatment (.5) and slightly higher in the Fixed 
Treatment (.3).  A Mann-Whitney test indicates that the probabilities are significantly 
different at the 5% level (z = -1.984).  However, this test is not very robust since we 
have only 5 perfectly independent observations in each treatment (one per session).  
Most principals choose to not reduce their payoffs—by increasing the monitoring 
probability beyond its equilibrium level—to enforce a moral norm. 
Third, under the assumption of selfishness, the level of output performed by the agents 
should increase in the monitoring intensity due to its disciplining effect, whatever the 
treatment and the nature of the employment relationship.  However, if the agent is 
intrinsically motivated, the level of output should be indifferent to the monitoring 
intensity.  If monitoring crowds out intrinsic motivation, the level of output is likely to 
be inversely related to the monitoring intensity, at least in the interpersonal relationship.  
A variant of the latter hypothesis is that the level of output should be higher when the 
principal does not exert her monitoring power in an interpersonal relationship because 
the agent can reciprocate to the trust signaled by the principal. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2. Distribution of the shares of output by monitoring intensity 
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Figure 2 shows that the share of an output at least equal to the desired level of 75 clearly 
increases in the monitoring intensity.  This tends to support the rational cheater 
hypothesis and the disciplining effect of monitoring.  Intrinsic motivation is not strong 
enough to guarantee the realization of the desired output in any monitoring 
circumstances.  Strong shirking (an effort level below 40) reacts to the introduction of a 
monitoring probability (its share decreases from 18% to 4%) but not to its intensity.  
However, some subjects still supply effort even when there is no risk of sanction—
about a quarter of the agents perform at the desired output level or even above this level 
when m=0. In addition, near a third of the agents do the same when the monitoring 
probability is in between .1 and .3, even though they should not produce y>40 in 
(selfish) equilibrium.  This may indicate that a fraction of the agents experience some 
level of intrinsic motivation, either for the interest of the task, for the principal’s choice 
not to monitor or to monitor below the equilibrium, or by integrity and commitment to 
moral principles.13 
We made the behavioral hypothesis that the relationship between output and monitoring 
is related to the nature of the relationship between the principal and the agent.  
Surprisingly, the average output is 69.53 in the abstract relationship and 70.07 in the 
interpersonal relationship.  The difference is not significant (Wilcoxon test, z = -0.255).  
The picture is somewhat more complicated when we relate average output to the 
monitoring intensity.  
                                                 
13 From an extensive U.S. survey about worker motivations, Minkler, 2004 shows that the rank-order of 
motivations is moral duty, intrinsic motivation, peer pressure and incentives. To a question about their 
motivation if it is impossible for their employer to check up of them, 83% of the respondents answered 
that they were “very likely” to work hard, and 12% that they were “somewhat likely” to do so.   Our data 
reveal a smaller proportion but we directly measure the work output and not only declarations of 
intention. 
 
 23
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 3. Average output by monitoring intensity and by type of employment 
relationship 
Figure 3 displays the average output by monitoring intensity and by type of employment 
relationship.  In an abstract employment relationship, the average effort increases 
relatively regularly with the audit probability, emphasizing the disciplining effect of 
monitoring.  In an interpersonal employment relationship, the average output is higher 
than in the abstract environment for most monitoring probabilities up to .5, and 
especially at m=0. However these differences are not significant (Wilcoxon test, z = -
1.274).  In contrast, beyond this probability, the average output becomes systematically 
lower than in the abstract relationship; this difference is only significant at the 14% 
level (Wilcoxon test, z = 1.478).  Agent output declines in the monitoring intensity, 
except when monitoring becomes certain or quasi-certain.  This cannot be explained by 
a lower risk aversion of the subjects (the Spearman coefficient of the correlation 
between risk aversion and effort is not significant; ρ=.11).  In such an environment, the 
disciplining effect of monitoring might be partly counteracted by its crowding-out 
effect. 
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The relationship between the principal and the agent also depends on the output sharing, 
or payoff, rule.  Despite a significantly weaker monitoring intensity in the Fixed 
Treatment, the average output is higher in this treatment (71.06) than in the Variable 
Treatment (68.57) and this difference is significant at the 5% level (Mann-Whitney test, 
z = 1.984).  This tends to indicate that effort is not only influenced by an intrinsic 
motivation for performing the task, risk aversion, individual monetary rewards, and the 
nature of the employment relationship, but also by distributive considerations, as 
already largely documented by inequality aversion theories (see Bolton and Ockenfels, 
2000; Fehr and Schmidt, 1999).  A figure displaying the average output by monitoring 
intensity and by type of treatment (not reported here) shows the same characteristics as 
Figure 3.  In the Fixed Treatment, the average output increases regularly in the 
monitoring intensity whereas in the Variable Treatment, it declines beyond a monitoring 
probability of .4, except when auditing is certain or quasi-certain.  In the Fixed 
Treatment, the intrinsic motivation for the task does not seem to be altered and the 
agents react to the disciplining effect of the increased monitoring intensity.  Since in this 
treatment the principal receives a fixed payoff, increasing her cost of monitoring is 
likely associated with the enforcement of a norm and this does not entail any negative 
reaction from the agent.  In contrast, in the Variable Treatment, reducing his output is a 
costly way for the agent to punish the principal for choosing a high monitoring 
intensity.  This is costly to the agent since it increases his risk of being caught shirking 
and it represents a sanction for the principal since her payoff is directly linked to the 
output level.  Thus, when distributional concerns are at work, increasing the monitoring 
intensity tends to undermine intrinsic motivation.  
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Figure 4. Distribution of the shares of output by type of employment relationship and by 
treatment when the principal chooses not to monitor 
 
Figure 4 only refers to those cases in which the principal chooses not to monitor the 
agent.  It shows that the difference in the proportion of strongly shirking agents between 
an abstract employment relationship and an interpersonal one is larger in the Variable 
than in the Fixed Treatment.  Since, in the Variable Treatment the principal’s payoff 
increases in the agent’s output, giving up the monitoring opportunity is a stronger signal 
of trust than in the Fixed Treatment.  Positive reciprocity may explain that in this case 
no agent engaged in an interpersonal relationship fully shirks, and near 40% of them 
perform at the desired level (instead of 26.3% in the Fixed Treatment), although it is 
costly for the agent and it only increases the principal’s payoff. 
However, one must be cautious about these indications since the number of 
observations in which the principal chooses m=0 is low (53 out of 1820 total 
observations).  More generally, these non parametric statistics are based on a small 
number of independent observations.  In addition, summary statistics do not control for 
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these dimensions are needed to identify the determinants of two endogenous variables at 
the individual level: monitoring intensity and output levels. 
4.2. Statistical analysis  
Table 3 presents the definition and descriptive statistics of variables used in the 
regressions to explain the endogenous variables, monitoring intensity and output level. 
Table 3. Variables and descriptive statistics 
 
Variable Definition Mean value Standard 
deviation 
Endogenous variables 
Monitoring intensity  Coded 0-10, for monitoring probability choices 
of 0-1 
3. 65  1.71  
Output Height achieved in the task by the agent 69.80 13.00 
Exogenous variables 
Interpersonal employment 
relationship 
=1 if group remains fixed and non anonymous  
across periods, =0 otherwise 
.50 .50 
Monitoring intensity * 
Interpersonal ER 
Monitoring intensity in an interpersonal 
employment relationship 
1.81 2.17 
Ordering Interpersonal then abstract employment 
relationship =1, and 0 otherwise 
.57 .49 
Time trend Period number from 1 to 20 10.5 5.77 
Periods 1 and 9 =1 if period 1 or 9 , =0 otherwise .10 0.30 
Task Difficulty Index Index of difficulty of the curve, equal to 
( )( )75 100 7510 D D D+ − ,  from 1549 to 1868 
1706.70 107.74 
Task Difficulty Index squared Index of difficulty squared 2924426.10 368826.80
Lagged output Output of the agent in the preceding period 69.98 13.29 
Principal’s gender 1 if the X-subject is a male,= 0 otherwise .57 .50 
Agent’s gender 1 if the Y-subject is a male,= 0 otherwise .49 .50 
Principal’s risk aversion Dummy=1 if the X-subject rejected the lottery .33 .47 
Agent’s risk aversion Dummy=1 if the Y-subject rejected the lottery .24 .43 
 
The exogenous variables are: the nature of the employment relationship, the 
environment ordering (when an interpersonal relationship precedes an anonymous one), 
a time trend, an index of difficulty for each curve and an index of difficulty squared.  
The lagged output level is also taken into account in the regressions to check how the 
principal reacts to the agent’s behavior.  An interaction term between the type of the 
employment relationship and the monitoring intensity is also entered in the regressions.  
Lastly, demographic variables such as gender are entered to control for their potential 
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impact.  Since variables such as school or age, the ordering of employment 
relationships, and the lagged audit and sanctions turned out not to be significant, they 
are omitted from the regressions presented below.  
We use random-effect GLS models to accommodate the data and explore first the 
determinants of the choice of a monitoring intensity by the principals (see Table 4) then 
the determinants of the output levels reached by the agents (see Table 5).  We consider 
the Variable and the Fixed Treatments in separate regressions. 
Table 4. The determinants of the monitoring intensity  
 
Dependent variable: 
Monitoring intensity 
Random effects GLS model 
Treatment Variable Fixed 
Interpersonal employment relationship 
 
 
Lagged output 
 
 
Time trend 
 
 
Principal’s risk aversion 
 
 
Principal’s gender  
 
 
Constant 
              - .065 
(.475) 
 
              - .020*** 
(.000) 
 
       .035*** 
(.000) 
 
                .128 
(.680) 
 
                .586** 
               (.043) 
 
              4.532*** 
(.000) 
               .014  
              (.898) 
 
             - .015*** 
              (.002) 
 
             - .052*** 
              (.000) 
 
               .444* 
              (.102) 
 
               .300 
              (.251) 
 
             4.735*** 
              (.000) 
 
Nb of observations  
Wald  χ2      
Prob >  χ2   
Overall R2 
                 828 
              62.39 
              0.000 
              0.0816 
                  810 
               44.37 
0.000 
  0.0572 
 
Note: The regressions have been  realized with StataTM 8.0. p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively.  
 
In the regression reported in Table 4, we observe that, whatever the treatment and the 
type of the employment relationship, most principals use their monitoring power.  They 
adjust their monitoring intensity to the output realized by the agent in the preceding 
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period even in an abstract relationship.  This effect occurs in both Variable and Fixed 
Treatments.  Thus, the fact that the principals’ payoffs could be affected by the agents’ 
output is not a determining factor of this effect.  In addition, there is no evidence that 
the repeated-interaction nature of the interpersonal employment relationship has any 
additional effect on principals’ behavior. 
Another significant effect of interest is the coefficient on the time trend variable.  The 
results indicate a trend over time of more monitoring in the Variable Treatment but less 
monitoring over time in the Fixed Treatment, ceteris paribus.  This may be in response 
to the downward trend of agents’ effort over time in the Variable Treatment (see Table 
5), which is of less direct importance to the principals in the Fixed Treatment.  This 
shows clear indication that principals are responding to the agency theory incentives of 
monitoring when own-payoffs are directly at stake.  Lastly, the principals’ risk aversion  
plays positively only in the Fixed Treatment  whereas in the Variable Treatment, males 
are less trustful than females. 
Table 5 shows results from our modeling of agents’ behavior.  While the intensity of 
monitoring is not influenced by the type of the principal-agent relationship, output is 
significantly higher in an interpersonal employment relationship in the Variable 
Treatment.  There is some evidence of a disciplining effect of monitoring as indicated 
by the positive and significant coefficient on the monitoring intensity variable in both 
treatments.  But in the Variable Treatment, there is also an indication of a crowding-out 
effect of monitoring on output in the interpersonal employment relationship: output is 
negatively influenced by the intensity of monitoring when principals and agents interact 
repeatedly.  The crowding-out effect is not visible in the Fixed Treatment, probably 
because there is no selfish intention attributed by the agents to the principals whose 
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payoffs do not increase in the level of output performed by the agents.  It suggests that 
the crowding-out effect of monitoring on effort is related to distributive considerations. 
Table 5. The determinants of the agent’s output 
Dependent variable:  
Level of output 
Random-effects GLS model 
Treatments Variable Fixed 
Interpersonal employment relationship 
 
 
Monitoring intensity 
 
 
Monitoring intensity * Interpersonal ER 
 
 
Task difficulty index 
 
 
Task difficulty index squared 
 
 
Time trend 
 
 
Periods 1 and 9 
 
 
Agent’s risk aversion 
 
 
Constant 
         4.331** 
(.026) 
 
     1.091*** 
(.001) 
 
        - 1.097** 
 (.019) 
 
   - .685*** 
(.000) 
 
      .000*** 
(.000) 
 
         - .123* 
(.066) 
 
    4.787*** 
(.000) 
 
3.258* 
(.075) 
 
665.373*** 
(.000) 
       - .362 
(.808)  
 
    1.164*** 
(.000) 
 
.472 
(.230) 
 
    - .432*** 
(.001) 
 
      .000*** 
(.002) 
 
.066 
(.276) 
 
    4.772*** 
(.000) 
 
        1.127 
(.527) 
 
 440.685*** 
(.000) 
Number of observations 
Wald  χ2      
Prob >  χ2   
Overall R2 
920 
90.91 
0.0000 
0.0627 
900 
84.07 
0.0000 
0.0643 
Note: The regressions have been  realized with StataTM 8.0. p-values are in parentheses. *, **, *** 
indicate statistical significance at the .10, .05, and .01 level, respectively.  
 
Not surprisingly, the output level is also influenced by the degree of difficulty of the 
task in both treatments.  Performance is lower when the profile of the curve makes 
reaching the desired target more costly.  But this relationship is not linear.  A possible 
explanation lies in the notion of job challenge, as already suggested in Montmarquette et 
al., 2005, and largely documented in the psychological literature (Locke, Saari, Shaw 
and Latham, 1981).  A higher output is observed in the first and the ninth periods in 
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both treatments, probably due to learning and a restart effects, respectively.  The 
coefficient on Time trend variable indicates that agents generally decrease their effort 
over time, ceteris paribus, though the effect is only significant in the Variable 
Treatment.  In addition, in the Variable Treatment, risk aversion pushes the agents to 
increase their effort in order to avoid a possible sanction.  In contrast, other 
specifications (not reported here) show that being audited or being sanctioned in the 
preceding period has no significant impact on the output realized in the current period. 
5. Conclusion and discussion 
The model provided by Frey, 1993 states that monitoring by a principal exerts a 
disciplining effect on agent’s effort in an abstract employment relationship whereas it 
has a crowding-out effect of intrinsic motivation when the principal and the agent are 
engaged in an interpersonal relationship because it reduces the scope for trust.  Agency 
theory and crowding-out theory could thus be complementary provided that account is 
taken of the nature of the employment relationship.  However, though the crowding-out 
effect of intrinsic motivation by monetary rewards has been largely documented in the 
literature, especially in psychology, empirical evidence of the crowding-out effect of 
monitoring has been scarce.  Our real-task laboratory experiment aims at testing the 
complementarity of agency and crowding-out theories as regards the influence of 
monitoring on performance.  We analyze the influences not only of the nature of the 
employment relationship but also of the sharing rules of the outcome, by comparing 
conditions where the employment relationship is either spot and anonymous or 
grounded in interpersonal links, and by comparing treatments in which the principal’s 
payoff increases or not in the level of agent’s performance.  
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Our main results show that both principals and agents respond to extrinsic incentives in 
the experimental design: (1) principals monitor less intensely when agents gave high 
effort in the previous period and monitoring trends up over time while agents’ output 
trends down, and (2) agents react to the disciplining power of the monitoring intensity 
by decreasing shirking when the perceived cost of such behavior is increased.  A 
fraction of the agents are also guided by intrinsic motivation: (3) a relatively high 
proportion of agents perform at the desired output level also when principals trustfully 
give up their monitoring power.  (4) Despite this observation, principals do not seem to 
believe in intrinsic motivation since they cannot refrain from monitoring their agents in 
most circumstances.  The evidence in support of the crowding-out of intrinsic 
motivation is less clear.  We observe that (5) when distributional concerns are at work 
(i.e. in the Variable Treatment) and when the employment relationship is based on 
interpersonal links, increasing the monitoring intensity beyond its equilibrium level 
tends to undermine intrinsic motivation.  It shows that the disciplining effect and the 
crowding-out effect of monitoring may coexist in interpersonal relationships and that 
the crowding-out effect is probably associated with concerns for the distribution of 
payoffs between the principal and the agent. 
These results tend to support the complementarity between agency theory and 
crowding-out theory.  We do not find however systematic evidence of such a crowding-
out effect.  Several remarks could be done.  First, our experimental design of the task to 
be performed by the subjects could be reproached for its insufficient ability to sustain 
intrinsic motivation.  As remarked by Deci et al., 1999, if an activity is dull and boring, 
one cannot expect to find external events such as performance-contingent rewards that 
undermine intrinsic motivation.  In our case, the task to perform was not a play task like 
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solving mazes or puzzles. But we can think that if it was considered too boring a task, 
we should have observed a systematic decrease of output over time in all treatments and 
conditions and in addition, we should not have ever observed any crowding-out effect. 
Second, the principal’s behavior with regards to monitoring is not affected by her being 
engaged in an interpersonal relationship.  Again, our procedure for establishing a non-
anonymous and repeated interaction could be criticized for its inability to reduce the 
social distance necessary for creating empathy and testing the crowding-out hypothesis.  
Experiments on rewards and intrinsic motivation in which anonymity was lifted and 
face-to-face procedures implemented have however shown that social pressure does not 
change significantly the slope of the wage-employment relationship compared to a 
standard repeated interaction (Falk, Gächter and Kovacs, 1999).  If our procedure was 
inadequate in producing social approval/disapproval pressure, we should not observe 
any effect of this procedure on the agents’ behavior either, that is not the case.  In fact, a 
study by Fehr and List, 2002, shows that even though the use of the threat to sanction 
shirking backfires by inducing less trustworthy behavior from the agents, the vast 
majority of subjects cannot refrain from using this threat.  In our experiment, we 
observe comparable hidden costs of monitoring and hidden rewards of not using this 
opportunity: in the interpersonal relationship especially, the principals’ average earnings 
are higher in the absence of monitoring (92.59, S.D.=10.47) than when the principals 
choose the equilibrium value (74.82, S.D.=18.55) and than when they choose a 
monitoring probability greater than .5 (67.97, S.D.=21.56).   
The social psychology of agency relationships has emphasized an extrinsic incentives 
bias, i.e. people think that the others are more motivated than themselves by extrinsic 
motivation and less motivated by intrinsic motivation (Heath, 1999).  For economists, 
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the preference for monitoring despite its negative effect on monetary payoff remains a 
paradox.  Our experiment suggests that this bias may exist; the average monitoring 
probability is greater in period 1 than in aggregate further periods although principals 
have no information on the motivation of their employees. It also suggests that the 
“excessive” use of monitoring by the principals (i.e. beyond its equilibrium level) as 
well as the reduction of effort by the agents beyond a certain monitoring threshold can 
be partly interpreted in terms of mutual punishment.  Principals pay to use monitoring in 
order to punish agents who perform less than desired in the preceding period and agents 
reduce effort and thus decrease their own expected payoff in order to punish principals 
whose payoff is directly linked to the agents’ level of performance.   As a consequence, 
it confirms that reducing monitoring activity in firms requires the prior establishment of 
mutual trust in order to be mutually beneficial. 
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Appendix. Instructions for the Variable Treatment (order: abstract relationship 
then  interpersonal relationship)14 
 
You are going to participate in an experiment which is part of a scientific program supported by 
the GATE research institute of the CNRS (National Center for Scientific Research), and by 
Utah State University in the U.S.A. During this experimental session, you are requested to make 
decisions and you can earn money. The amount of your earnings depends on your own decisions 
and on those of the other participants with whom you will interact. 
This session consists in 2 parts of 10 periods each. The session should last about one hour. 
During this session, your payoffs will be calculated in ECU (Experimental Currency Units) and 
put on an account.  
? At the beginning of the session, your account will be credited of 150 ECUs, which are 
given as an initial endowment. 
? During each period, you can earn or lose ECUs. Please note that your decisions can avoid 
losses with certainty and that possible losses in some periods should be compensated for 
by earnings in other periods. 
? Your final earnings are equal to the sum of the ECU you will earn in each of the 20 
periods. At the end of the session, the total amount of ECU you have earned on your 
account will be converted to Euros at the following rate: 
150 ECU = 1 € 
Your entire earnings in Euros will be paid in cash in a separate room to preserve 
confidentiality. 
Throughout the entire session, talking is not allowed except when invited by the experimenter. 
Any violation of this rule will result in being excluded from the session and not receiving 
payment. If you have any questions regarding these instructions, please raise your hand. 
Someone will answer your questions privately.  
 
During this session, the group of participants is subdivided into two categories in equal number: 
X and Y participants. Your computer indicates whether you are a X- or a Y-participant. 
Whether X or Y, you keep the same role throughout this session.  
Rules for Periods 1-10 
 
During each period, pairs of participants are randomly formed (each X-participant is matched 
with one Y-participant). At each new period, new pairs are randomly formed. You are not 
necessarily matched with the same person from one period to the other. Nobody will be 
informed of the identity of the participants s/he interacted with during these periods. 
 
Roles 
 
? The X-participant asks the Y-participant to realize a task in exchange for which s/he will 
receive a payment. S/He can apply a monitoring probability to Y’s result. 
 
? The Y-participant performs a task and achieves a result.  
                                                 
14 The other sets of instructions corresponding to the other treatments are available upon request to the 
authors. 
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What does occur in each period? 
Each period consists of three stages : 
? First stage: the X-participant decides on whether the result of the Y-participant will be 
submitted to an audit at the end of the period. S/He chooses this probability of the audit 
among the following values: 
 
(0; .1; .2; .3; .4; .5; .6; .7; .8; .9; 1) 
 
Examples: if s/he chooses the 0 value, this means that no audit will be done. If s/he 
chooses the .1 value, this means that the Y-participant’s output has 1 chance out of 10 to 
be checked.  If s/he chooses the 1 value, this means that the Y-participant’s output will be 
checked with certainty. 
 
Each probability is associated with a cost in ECUs that has to be borne by the X-
participant, as indicated in the following Table: 
 
Probability 0 .1 .2 .3 .4 .5 .6 .7 .8 .9 1 
Audit Cost 
paid by X 0 0 0 3 8 15 24 36 50 66 84 
 
It should be noted that this cost is to be paid by the X-participant, should the result of the 
Y-participant be actually checked or not.  
 
? Second stage: the Y-participant is informed about the choice by X of the audit 
probability.  In each period, which lasts 1 minute, each Y-participant has to perform 
a task on his or her computer to achieve an outcome or result. 
o Nature of the task to be performed 
This task consists in uncovering a curve where a line has been plotted beforehand. This 
curve is increasing and/or flat. It can have single or multiple plates that are ranked from 
the lowest to the highest. The highest altitude that can be reached by this curve, measured 
in points, is 100. The Y-participant uncovers the line of this curve as s/he moves along. 
Starting from point 0, s/he is making progress at the same time in terms of distance (one 
goes along the horizontal axis) and in terms of altitude (one goes up on the vertical axis). 
The Y-participant moves by clicking one of the two buttons offered on his computer 
screen. These two buttons correspond to two available speeds. 
 
? A first button enables the Y-participant to take “steps of 1”. Steps of 1 do not cost 
money. 
? A second button enables the use of “steps of 2”. These steps are twice as rapid as 
steps of 1, but they cost money. Their cost is determined according to the following 
principle: 
 
? Each of the first 10 steps of 2  costs .4 ECU  
? Each of the next 10 steps of 2  costs .6 ECU  
? Each of the next steps of 2 beyond the 20th costs 1 ECU. 
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It is possible to switch speed at will and as many times as desired. As long as the Y-
participant does not want to change speed, s/he holds the mouse down and the progression 
along the curve automatically proceeds at the chosen speed. 
The Y-participant can stop the progression whenever s/he likes, even before the one-
minute time is over. During the progression, the participant is informed of the current 
height reached, cumulated cost of steps of 2 and remaining time. 
 
o The result 
 
One names « result » the height reached when the Y-participant stops her/his progression 
or when the time is over; no matter the distance from the origin, only the height reached 
matters.  This result is expressed in points and can take all integer values between 0 and 
100. The maximum height of the curve being 100, the maximum result is thus also 100 
points. 
 
? Third stage: the computer program applies the audit probability to the result of the Y-
participant and determines the participants’ payoffs.  
 
4 cases may occur.   
 
o If the result is not audited, Y receives 100 ECUs. 
o If audited and the result is between 75 and 100 points, Y receives 100 
ECUs. 
o If audited and the result is between 40 and 74 points, a penalty of 40 ECUs 
is applied: Y receives then 60 ECUs instead of 100 ECUs. 
o If audited and the result is lower than 40 points, a penalty of 80 ECUs is 
applied: Y receives then 20 ECUs instead of 100 ECUs. 
 
A summary table on the participants’ computer screens indicates for each past period 
the following elements:  
 
o The audit probability chosen by the X-participant 
o The result reached by the Y-participant 
o The existence of an audit when it occurred 
o The payoffs for the period of the X- and Y-participants of the pair. 
 
A new period starts automatically. Each new period is independent of the preceding 
periods. With each new period is associated a new curve. 
 
Determination of the earnings in each period 
 
? The payoff of the X-participant is determined as follows:  
    2.5 times the result in points reached by the Y-participant 
-   the cost of the chosen audit probability 
-   the amount paid to the Y-participant after deduction of the penalty, if 
applicable, as explained above.  
? The payoff of the Y-participant is determined as follows: 
      100 ECUs  
-    the cost of the steps of 2 used by the Y-participant 
-    the penalty, if applicable. 
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It should be noted that, on average, reaching the result of 75 points requires 30 steps of 2,  
entailing a cost of 20 ECUs. These payoffs are calculated by the computer. Participants do not 
have to make any calculation by themselves. 
 
Rules for periods  11 – 20 
[This part of the instructions were distributed only when the first part of the session has 
been completed]. 
 
The task is the same as in the first 10 periods. The payoffs are determined in a similar way. As 
previously, a new curve appears at each new period.  
 
The only difference is that from now on, you will interact with the same person until the end of 
the session.  
 
We will indicate to you the participant with whom you will interact during the next ten periods. 
You have 5 minutes to introduce each other before the starting of period 11. To introduce each 
other, we ask you to fill a single presentation questionnaire together: the X-participant will write 
the answers to the questions s/he asks to the Y-participant with whom s/he is matched and the 
Y-participant will write the answers to the questions s/he asks to the X-participant with whom 
s/he is matched.  
 
Attention: during this introduction, it is strictly forbidden to talk about the experiment and to 
conclude agreements, under penalty of exclusion from the experiment.  
From the beginning of period 11 to the end of the session, you are not allowed to communicate 
either with your partner or with any other participant.  
 
[Example of the introduction sheet] 
 
X- Participant (to be filled in by the Y-participant) 
Computer Id:  …………… 
Y- Participant (to be filled in by the X-participant) 
Computer Id:  ……………. 
First name : 
School :  
Number of brothers and sisters :   
Favorite music groups: 
Hobbies :  
Location of vacations last Summer: 
First name : 
School :  
Number of brothers and sisters :   
Favorite music groups: 
Hobbies :  
Location of vacations last Summer: 
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